State of Utah v. Kelly Robbennolt : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
State of Utah v. Kelly Robbennolt : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Taylor C. Hartley; The Advocate Attorney, LLC; Counsel for Appellant.
Laura B. Dupaix; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Sherry
Ragen; Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Kelly Robbennolt, No. 20110436 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2881
Case No. 20110436-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
KELLY ROBBENNOLT, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from a conviction for forgery, a third degree felony, in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, Utah County, the 
Honorable Darold McDade presiding 
LAURA B. DUPAIX (5195) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 TAYLOR C. HARTLEY (11397) 
The Advocate Attorney, LLC 
21 E. 100 N., Ste. 205 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Counsel for Appellant 
SHERRY RAGAN 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
Counsel for Appellee 
No oral argument requested 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 20110436-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
KELLY ROBBENNOLT, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from a conviction for forgery, a third degree felony, in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, Utah County, the 
Honorable Darold McDade presiding 
LAURA B. DUPAIX (5195) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 TAYLOR C. HARTLEY (11397) 
The Advocate Attorney, LLC 
21 E. 100 R , Ste. 205 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Counsel for Appellant 
SHERRY RAGAN 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
Counsel for Appellee 
No oral argument requested 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Summary of Facts 2 
Summary of the Proceedings 11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 13 
ARGUMENT 14 
THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED; 
ALTERNATIVELY AMPLE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS HIS 
FORGERY CONVICTION 14 
A. Defendant inadequately briefs his claims 15 
B. Defendant fails to marshal the evidence 17 
C. Alternatively, ample evidence supports Defendant's conviction 22 
1. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that 
Defendant lacked authority to use Abbott's signature 22 
2. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that 
Defendant acted with a purpose to defraud Mangum 24 
CONCLUSION 29 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A: Statute 
Addendum B: Transcript of Trial Court's Oral Findings 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Angilau v. Winder, 2011 UT 13,248 P.3d 975 16 
Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT App 503,128 P.3d 63 18 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,100 P.3d 1177 20 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App 1993) 28 
Hill v. Estate ofAllred, 2009 UT 28, 216 P.3d 929 ..27 
Madsen v. Washington Mut. Bank FSB, 2008 UT 69,199 P.3d 898 28 
State ex rel. P.S., 2001 UT App 305,38 P.3d 303 24, 25 
State v. Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, 38 P.3d 982 19 
State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75,197 P.3d 628 1,18 
State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75,124 P.3d 235 .....19 
State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1991) 23,25 
State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 988 P.2d 949 25,26 
State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106,999 P.2d 1252 ...2 
State v. Nielsen, 2011 UT App 211,257 P.3d 1103 16 
State v. Stewart, 2011 UT App 185, 257 P.3d 1055 2,18 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) 16 
State v. Turner, 282 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1955) 17, 26 
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985)........ 26 
State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1999) 17, 24,26 
Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18,20 P.3d 332 20 
-ii-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 
2006 UT 35,140 P.3d 1200 18 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West Supp. 2011) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West 2009) 1,14,24 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West 2009) .1 
Utah R. App. P. 24 16,18 
i 
i 
•iii-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CaseNo.20110436-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
KELLY ROBBENNOLT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for forgery, a third degree 
felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (West 2009). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that 
Defendant was guilty of forgery? 
Standard of Review. "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the 
evidence, [an appellate court] must sustain the trial court's judgment unless 
it is against the clear weight of the evidence," or if the court otherwise 
reaches "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State 
v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, ^  10,197 P.3d 628 (quoting State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, ] 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5, 84 P.3d 1167) (internal quotations omitted). A trial court's interpretation 
of binding case law is reviewed for correctness. State v. Stewart, 2011 UT App 
185, If 6, 257 P.3d 1055 (quoting State v. Richardson, 843 R2d 517, 518 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute is attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West Supp. 2011) (forgery)' 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Facts 
Defendant promises a secured investment 
In early 2008, Defendant was a neighbor of Brent Mangum's and a 
partner in an investment company, American Star Lending. R110:128. 
•I 
Defendant was also involved in Keystone Venture Group, a rapidly 
deteriorating partnership with Douglas Scott Abbott. See R110:23, 25-27, 29. 
Mangum entered into a junior partnership agreement with American ( 
Star Lending in April, 2008. R110:130, Ri l l (Def. Ex. 3). The partnership 
1
 Stylistic changes were made to the relevant section of the forgery < 
statute after Defendant committed the offense. Because the amendments do 
not affect the analysis of this case, the State cites to the current code section. 
2
 Consistent with appellate standards, the State recites the facts in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See State v. Larsen, 2000 UT y 
App 106, \ 2, 999 P.2d 1252. 
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agreement was signed by Defendant's business partner, Sam Kassir. Ri l l 
(Def. Ex. 3, p. 9). But Mangum testified that his dealings were "almost 
exclusively" with Defendant, whom he understood to be a partner in 
American Star Lending. R110:174; Rlll(Defendant Ex. 1). The agreement 
stated that Mangum's "investment shall be secured by a deed of trust against 
a property" and that a promissory note and deed of trust "shall be issued." 
R i l l (Def. Ex. 3, p. 4). It said that Mangum would receive monthly interest 
payments and would be trained in the land development business. Id. 
Defendant, however, did not produce the promised security interest 
for the $130,000 Mangum invested in May 2008, nor for the $42,000 
investment he made in October 2008.4 R110:129-30. Mangum started asking 
questions in December 2008, after the monthly interest payments stopped. 
R110:131. Defendant could not explain why the payments stopped, but told 
Mangum that Kassir had agreed to facilitate the payments. R110:131-32. 
Unsatisfied, Mangum pushed for documentation of his security interest. He 
wanted to know "where the money is and what [his] recourse was." 
R110:132. 
3
 Kassir is also referred to as Hassan in some documents. 
4
 The agreement was for a $200,000 investment, but Mangum only 
invested $172,000. 
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Finally, in mid-January 2009, Defendant gave Mangum a "Partial 
Assignment of Deed of Trust" to property in Townsend, Montana.5 
R110:133-34; R i l l (St. Ex. A). The deed seemed suspicious to Mangum. 
R110.133-35; Ri l l (St. Ex. A). It was signed December 3, 2007 - several 
months before Mangum had agreed to invest any money. See id. It was 
notarized in Utah County, not Montana where the property was located. See 
id. And it was signed by Douglas Scott Abbott, a man with whom Mangum 
had no prior dealings. See id. 
When Mangum confronted Defendant about the irregularities, 
Defendant said "[gjive that back to me and I will fix it." R110:135. Mangum 
demanded a properly recorded deed, but Defendant replied that "it would 
take at least two weeks, it would cost $500[,] and that he couldn't go through 
the normal course but [that] what he would get [Mangum] would suffice." 
R110:136. Defendant also discouraged Mangum from contacting Abbott. 
R110:137. Defendant alleged that Abbott was trying to steal Defendant's 
home and ruin his reputation. R110:137-38. Mangum eventually decided to 
contact Abbott anyway. R110:139. 
5
 This property is also described in exhibits as 299 acres in Broadwater { 
County, Montana. See generally Ri l l . 
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The "secured investment" is unsecured 
Abbott, meanwhile, had learned that Defendant was trying to raise 
money from Mangum. Abbott tried, at first unsuccessfully, to contact 
Mangum to warn him about Defendant. R110:27-28. When the two finally 
met, Abbott told Mangum that he had not signed the deed of trust. R110:30, 
140. 
Defendant, meanwhile, told Mangum that Abbott was lying and that 
the deed was a "good document/' When Mangum pushed for 
documentation of the promised security interest, Defendant gave him 
documents describing ownership of the Montana property. The documents 
contained "a lot of people's names/' but not Mangum's. R110:141, 154-55. 
Mangum contacted the investor who owned the majority of the Montana 
property. R110:141. The investor did not know who Mangum was and was 
unaware of any other liens or encumbrances. Id. 
As Mangum pressed for answers, Defendant "sent all sorts of e-mails 
with deadlines and demands." R110:151. Defendant asserted that although 
the Montana property was listed in Abbott's name, it was an asset owned by 
Keystone Venture Group. R110:153. Defendant said Abbott held the 
property on behalf of Keystone. R110:164. Defendant said that before their 
business relationship deteriorated, Abbott would "often sign multiple, partial 
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notarized deeds of trusts" for Defendant to fill out at later dates.6 R110:164. 
Defendant further told Mangum that American Star Lending had a $300,000 
interest in the Montana property, "with a signed, notarized deed of trust." 
R110.164. Defendant asserted that Abbott had "simply asked the company to 
provide a direct deed of trust for [Mangum] from Keystone/' rather than 
place Mangum's name on the American Star Lending deed.7 R110:164. 
Defendant initially told Mangum that his investment was with 
Keystone. R110:174. Mangum was worried because Abbott told him that 
Keystone "was in deep trouble." R110:174. But Defendant then assured 
Mangum that his investment was safe because it was with American Star 
Lending, and not Keystone. R110:174. Abbott testified that he did not know 
who Mangum had invested with, and, as of trial, Keystone investors had not 
received any of the money from the Montana property. R110:34, 76. 
6
 Abbott denied this. R110: 91-92. 
7
 Abbott testified that he "never agreed to sign any document for Brent 
Mangum." R110:94, 112. He also never authorized an interest for Kassir or 
American Star Lending. R110:lll. Kassir was apparently brought on as a ( 
Keystone consultant at some point. Ri l l (Def. Ex. 7, p. 1). 
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Defendant's role in Keystone 
Abbott met Defendant through a church friend, and the three went 
into business together, forming Keystone Venture Group, Inc.8 R110:21-23. 
Abbott's role was as investor and shareholder. R110:23-24. In 2006, Abbott 
first invested between $5,000 and $6,000 for a project in La Verkin. R110:22. 
All company shares were initially placed in Abbott's name because 
Defendant "had this outstanding issue with the IRS, and he said he couldn't 
own any assets in his name because of it." R110:24. Abbott did all the signing 
for the business, which Defendant operated. Id. 
A deed of trust on property in Townsend, Montana had been 
purchased for $965,000 to secure the more than $1.5 million that Abbott and 
his friends and family had invested in Keystone. R110:32. The deed of trust 
was recorded in Abbott's name, and an interest was given to all of the 
"Abbott related investors." R110:32-33. However, there were errors in the 
documentation; so in fall 2007, Defendant asked Abbott to notarize deeds of 
trust to correct those errors. R110:88. Abbott signed the notarized deeds of 
trust solely to correct errors with existing deeds assigned to the then-existing 
"Abbott related investors." R110:88, 94-95. Defendant was to fill in the 
8
 The third business partner withdrew at some point before the facts of 
this case arose, leaving Abbott and Defendant equal partners. 
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names of the then-existing Abbott related investors and the amount that each 
was owed. R110:88. Abbott testified that Defendant's authority to use his 
notarized signature was limited to registering the Abbott related investors. 
R110: 91-92. 
Other than the limited scope for which the 2007 partial deed of trusts 
were issued, Abbott testified that he did not give Defendant authority to use 
his signature. R110:94-95. Nor did he authorize Defendant to use his 
signature to create an interest in the Montana property for Mangum, Kassir, 
or American Star Lending. R110:94,111-12. 
Keystone unravels 
In early 2008, Abbott began to find out //troubling,/ things about 
Defendant, and initiated steps to protect his investment. R110:25. In March, 
2008, Defendant and Abbott entered into "Keystone Restructure Agreement 
A" and "Stocks Purchase Agreement B." Ri l l (Def. Exs. 1 & 2). The two 
agreed to a list of "existing Company projects with contracts, options, or title 
ownership". Ri l l (Def. Ex. 1, p. 3). They agreed that Defendant would 
continue to "lead, operate and manage Keystone" in the best interest of its 
investors. Id. at 5. Defendant agreed to "consult with Abbott and seek his 
approval" before entering into a real estate development relationship with a 
Keystone or MCI Development contact. Id. 
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Abbott also sold half his Keystone shares to Defendant, in exchange for 
Defendant's agreement to restructure and settle Keystone's more than $1.5 
million in "Abbott Related Debt." Ri l l (Def. Ex. 2, p. 2). Abbott took on a 
consultant role with Keystone. Id. at 3. The relationship deteriorated and the 
two partners became embroiled in litigation against each other.9 R110:29-30, 
74; see also "Settlement Agreement" Ri l l (Def. Ex. 10). 
Abbott resigned from Keystone on August 5, 2008. R110:25-26, 
"Resignation, Settlement & Release Agreement" Ri l l (Def. Ex. 7). Abbott 
sought the return of the money he, his friends, and his relatives had invested 
in Keystone. R110:79-80; Ri l l (Def. Ex. 7). In the dissolution agreement, the 
Montana property was described as being held in trust "for the benefit of 
Abbott." Ri l l (Def. Ex. 7, p. 1). The Montana property was to be sold, along 
with other identified properties, "to repay [Abbott related] investors," who 
were listed in Exhibit A. Id. at 3-4, 7; R110:80. Mangum was not on the list. 
See id. 
Defendant continues to use Abbott's signature 
In spring 2009, several months after Abbott had resigned from 
Keystone, David Nixon contacted Defendant about an investment he, his 
9
 The lawsuits were apparently related to Defendant's rental of a home 
owned by Abbott. See R110:120-23. 
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father, and his mother-in-law had made with Defendant. R110:179-81. 
Defendant told Nixon that he "had about five notarized signatures of Scott 
Abbott's . . . in his possession/' R110:182. Nixon knew that Abbott and 
Defendant had dissolved their business relationship and told Defendant that 
he should return the documents. Defendant replied, "No, I don't need to do 
that." R110:182-83. 
Nixon informed Abbott that Defendant was using his notarized 
signatures. R110:lll-12. When Abbott confronted Defendant, Defendant 
asserted that he had the right to use the notarized documents. R110:35. 
Abbott was "very concerned" that Defendant was using his signature 
without permission. R110:lll-12. On February 10, 2010, Abbott entered into 
a "Due Diligence & Evidence Agreement," in which Defendant affirmed that 
he had destroyed all "known notarized documents."10 R110:89-90; Ri l l (Def. 
Ex. 15, p. 1). The agreement also provided proof of who held interests in the 
Montana property. Id. at 3. In a separate agreement, Kassir agreed to 
i 
relinquish American Star Lending's interest in the Montana property, and 
10
 Nixon's father, Charles Timothy, also held a deed of trust in the 
Montana property, which was allegedly notarized by Abbott. See Rl 10:34, 
186-87. The "Timothy" interest was not indicated in the 2008 "Resignation, 
Settlement and Release Agreement" but was listed in the 2010 "Due 
Diligence & Evidence Agreement" Ri l l (Def. Ex's. 7, 15). Abbott was i 
apparently aware of this interest. See R110:33. 
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Mangum, for the first time, was given an interest in the property.11 RllOllO-
11; R i l l (Def. Ex. 13). Although he had "never agreed to sign any document 
for Brent Mangum/' Abbott testified that he later provided Mangum an 
interest because he "felt very poorly for him" and "wanted to see him get 
some money back." R110:94,110,112. As of trial, the Montana property had 
yet to be liquidated, and the Keystone investors had not seen any return. 
R110:34,76. 
Summary of the Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with one count of forgery, a third degree 
felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West Supp. 2011). Rl. Defendant 
waived his right to a jury. R56. A bench trial was held on February 23, 2011. 
R65-64, R110. In finding Defendant guilty, the court stated that Defendant 
did "submit a document to Mr. Mangum, purporting to transfer an interest in 
some property." R110:221. The court found that Defendant had no authority 
to hand over the deed of trust on Abbott's behalf: "Mr. Abbott's signature 
was needed because the property was in his name. . . . At least in this 
transaction, [Defendant] wasn't a signer." R110:222. 
11
 It is unclear from the record how, or when, Sam Kassir, on behalf of 
American Star Lending, obtained a fractional share of the Montana property. 
No such interest was listed in the 2008 Resignation, Settlement and Release 
Agreement. See R i l l (Def. Ex. 7). Abbott testified that he found the interest 
in a title search and that either Defendant or Kassir had produced "another 
document" giving Kassir ownership. R110: 83; 112. 
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The court further found no contractual relationship between Abbott 
and Mangum. R110:223. Rather, Defendant "did this on his own. Normally 
in business relationships, I would think, especially when that interest is gone, 
that authority would still be out of respect and trust, at least asked of, 
mentioned to, something/7 R110:223. 
The court further found that Defendant used Abbott's signature 
without permission in an attempt to defraud Mangum: 
[Defendant] needed Mr. Abbott's signature; that authority wasn't 
given. And, again, it seems to me that [Defendant] was trying to 
do what he could to make things right. I think you get yourself 
involved in these kind [sic] of things and you do things to try and 
make it right and then you hope that later you can fix the 
situation. This is a lot of money involved. And I think he was 
trying to do the right thing but that doesn't detract from fact [sic] 
that no authority [sic] to sign and he was trying to defraud in 
accordance with what the elements are of the charge. 
R110:223.12 
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of up to five 
years in prison. R69. The sentence was suspended, and Defendant was 
instead ordered to serve 120 days in jail and serve 36 months' 
probation.13 R69-68. Defendant timely appealed. R72. 
A copy of the transcript of the trial court's oral ruling is attached in 
Addendum B. 
13
 Defendant has filed a separate appeal of an order to pay $247,200 in { 
restitution. That appeal is assigned Case No. 20110831-CA. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial 
court's finding that he was guilty of forgery. Defendant first argues that the 
trial court erroneously concluded that he acted with the purpose to defraud. 
Defendant second challenges the trial court's finding that he lacked authority 
to use Scott Abbott's signature. 
This Court should not consider the merits of Defendant's claims 
because he inadequately briefs them. Defendant also fails to marshal the 
evidence. Defendant's fact statement omits most of the evidence against him. 
Defendant's failure to marshal continues into his argument section where he 
fails to mention, for example, that the scope of Abbott's permission to use his 
signature was limited to correcting errors in existing deeds at the time he 
signed them in 2007; that Abbott had ended his business relationship with 
Defendant before Defendant issued the deed of trust to Brent Mangum using 
Abbott's signature; and that Keystone had no contractual obligation to 
Mangum. Nor does Defendant mention that at the time he issued the partial 
deed to Mangum, his authority over the property was solely to liquidate it to 
recoup existing Keystone investors' losses. Defendant's briefing and 
marshaling failures are reasons alone to affirm his conviction. 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In any event, ample evidence in the record shows that Defendant 
handed Mangum a document signed by Abbott, which Defendant had no 
authority to use, and that Defendant did so to convince Mangum that his 
investment was secured as promised in the investment agreement. These 
facts support a reasonable inference that Defendant did so to forestall 
Mangum from withdrawing his investment or taking legal action. The trial 
court could reasonably conclude from these facts that Defendant acted with 
the purpose to defraud Mangum. 
ARGUMENT 
THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED; 
ALTERNATIVELY AMPLE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS HIS 
FORGERY CONVICTION 
"A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or 
with knowledge that the person is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by 
anyone, the person (a) alters any writing of another without his authority or 
utters the altered writing; or (b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, 
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that [it] . . . purports to be 
the act of another; . . . [or] purports to be an act on behalf of another party 
with the authority of that other party/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (West 
Supp.2011). 
-14-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
forgery conviction. In so doing, he does not dispute that he issued a partial 
deed of trust to which he attached a notarized signature of his former 
business partner, Abbott. See Ri l l (St. Ex. A). Defendant asserts only that (1) 
there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had no authority to use 
Abbott's signature and (2) the trial court "did not find . . . intent to defraud." 
See Br.Aplt. at 11. 
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence should not be 
considered, first, because he fails to adequately brief his claims. Second, 
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence. Alternatively, ample evidence at 
trial proved that Defendant did not have authority to use Abbott's signature. 
Moreover, contrary to Defendant's claims, the trial court did find that he 
acted with a purpose to defraud. See R110:223. The evidence also amply 
supported that finding. 
A. Defendant inadequately briefs his claims. 
Defendant's insufficiency challenge should not be considered because 
it is inadequately briefed. An appellate "argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial 
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
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relied." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Rule 24(a)(9) "requires not just bald citation 
to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis of that 
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). 
Appellate courts are not depositories where appellants "may dump the 
burden of argument and research." Id. (citations omitted). This Court, 
therefore, "will not address issues that are inadequately briefed." State v. 
Nielsen, 2011 UT App 211,1 5,257 P.3d 1103 (citing Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304). 
Defendant's brief sets out no legal analysis to support his contention 
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. For example, 
Defendant claims that the evidence "conclusively shows" that he had 
authority to use Abbott's signature "during the 2009 alleged forgery." See 
Br.Aplt. at 16. But, rather than citing authority, Defendant merely restates his 
trial interpretation of the evidence. See Br.Aplt at 16-24; R110:196-214 
(Defendant's closing statement). Defendant also does not cite a single case to 
support his claim. Merely "setting forth selected facts from" trial and 
"making conclusory statements," without legal analysis of those facts, does 
not meet the requirements of rule 24. Angilau v. Winder, 2011 UT 13, | 28, 248 
P.3d 975. This is reason alone to reject Defendant's claim. 
The trial court found Defendant "was trying to defraud" when he gave 
Mangum the partial deed of trust. R110:223. Yet, Defendant claims that the 
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trial court did not make this finding. See Br.Aplt. at 11. Defendant 
alternatively asserts that the trial court's finding is "clearly inconsistent" with 
its statement that Defendant was "trying to do the right thing." See Br.Aplt. at 
15. To support this contention, Defendant cites two cases: State v. Winward, 
909 P.2d 909, 912-13 (Utah App. 1999) and State v. Turner, 282 P.2d 1045,1047 
(Utah 1955). See Br.Aplt at 11-15. Defendant accurately states the rule from 
those cases - that a forgery conviction requires a defendant to act with either 
a purpose to defraud or knowledge of facilitating fraud. See id. Yet, 
Defendant does not apply that rule to the facts of his case. Instead, he merely 
states that it would be "clearly inconsistent... as a matter of law" for a court 
to find both that a defendant "was trying to do the right thing" and had the 
requisite mental state to commit a forgery. See Br.Aplt. at 15. As stated 
above, this "bald citation to authority" does not meet the requirements of 
rule 24(a)(9). 
This Court should therefore affirm. 
B. Defendant fails to marshal the evidence. 
This Court should also decline to consider the merits because 
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's 
judgment. 
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"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, [an 
appellate court] must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the 
clear weight of the evidence," or if the court otherwise reaches "a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 
75, % 10,197 R3d 628 (quoting State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, f 5, 84 P.3d 1167) 
(internal quotations omitted). See also State v. Stewart, 2011 UT App 185, Tf 6, 
257P.3dl055. 
Defendant must, therefore, "marshal all record evidence that supports" 
his conviction before he can attack its validity. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). See 
also CacJie County v. Beus, 2005 UT App 503, \ 11, 128 P.3d 63. Proper 
marshaling requires Defendant to "embrace" the position he opposes: 
[Appellants] are required to temporarily remove their own 
prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position; they must 
play the "devil's advocate." In so doing, appellants must present 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court and not 
attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their 
case. . . . In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the 
challenging party must demonstrate how the court found the 
facts from the evidence and then explain why those findings 
contradict the clear weight of the evidence. 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Yonds, 2006 UT 35, 
\ 26, 140 P.3d 1200 (citations and internal quotations and alterations 
omitted). This Court may and should rely on Defendant's failure to "perform 
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this critical task" to affirm the trial court. Id. at f 27; State v. Clark, 2005 UT 
75,Tfl7,124P.3d235. 
Defendant acknowledges his duty to marshal, yet throughout his brief 
ignores most of the evidence against him. Defendant claims he marshals by 
citing to the trial court's explanation of its judgment. See Br.Aplt at 13-15,16. 
But Defendant misses the point of marshaling. Marshaling, at a 
minimum, requires appellants to state the facts from trial that are contrary to 
their position. Yet, most of the facts Defendant states throughout his brief are 
presented in the context most favorable to his own position. Moreover, 
rather than citing to the facts and evidence adduced at trial, Defendant 
largely cites to the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. See 
Br.Aplt. at 6-9,19, 21-23. When reviewing a sufficiency challenge to a verdict, 
this Court may consider "only the evidence presented at trial." See State v. 
Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, Tj 4, n.2, 38 P.3d 982 (citing cases emphasizing 
that sufficiency of evidence claims must be based on evidence presented at 
trial). 
Defendant's "tactic of simply rearguing and recharacterizing the trial 
court's factual findings does not constitute marshaling." Clark, 2005 UT 75, f 
17. Defendant cannot "shift the burden of marshaling by falsely claiming 
there is no evidence in support of the trial court's findings." Chen v. Stewart, 
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2004 UT 82, If 78,100 P.3d 1177. See also Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, Tf33, 20 
P.3d 332 (declining to consider issue where appellant lists "only the facts that 
she believes contradict or undermine the district court's ruling"). 
"The purpose of this rigorous and strict requirement" is two-fold: 
"efficiency and fairness." Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 79 (citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida 
Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Utah App. 1994)) 
(internal citations omitted). Marshaling "promotes efficiency by avoiding 
'retrying the facts7 and by assisting the appellate court in its 'decision-making 
and opinion writing/" Id. Likewise, marshaling "promotes fairness by 
requiring that the appellants bear the expense and time of marshaling the 
evidence rather than putting the appellee in the 'precarious position' of 
performing the appellant's work at 'considerable time and expense/" Id. 
"This deference to a trial court's findings . . . fosters the principle that 
appellants rather than appellees bear the greater burden on appeal." Id. 
Defendant's brief suggests that Defendant issued Mangum the partial 
deed of trust in the regular course of his Keystone management duties while 
Abbott was a partner in Keystone. See Br.Aplt. at 6-9, 22-24. But that account 
directly conflicts with the testimony at trial. See R110 passim. A comparison 
of Defendant's facts and argument to the State's Statement of the Case and Facts 
above readily demonstrates Defendant's marshaling failures. 
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For example, Defendant does not mention, until the last section of his 
brief, that Mangum's contract was with American Star Lending, and not 
Keystone. See Br.Aplt at 22-23. Even there, Defendant fails to note that he 
issued the partial deed of trust to Mangum only after Abbott had severed his 
business partnership with Defendant. R110:25-26; Ri l l (Def. Ex. 7). 
Defendant concedes that he had no "explicit, verbal authority to use 
[Abbott's] signature on the partial deed of trust delivered to Mr. Mangum" in 
January, 2009. Br.Aplt at 7; see also R110:91-92, 95. Defendant ignores, 
however, the evidence presented at trial that reveals he also had no written 
authority. Defendant then omits that his authority to use Abbott's signature 
was limited to correcting errors in recording Abbott related interests that 
existed in 2007. See R110:32-33, 88, 91-92. Defendant also ignores that his 
authority over the Montana property was merely to liquidate it to repay 
Abbott related Keystone investors. See R110:80; Ri l l (Def. Ex. 7). 
Defendant also omits Abbott's testimony that he had not, as Defendant 
contends, regularly pre-authorized the use of his signature on notarized 
deeds. See R110:91-92, 164. Defendant also fails to mention that Abbott 
denied authorizing an interest in the Montana property for Sam 
Kassir/ American Star Lending. R110: 83, 94,111-12; Ri l l (Def. Ex. 7 p.7) (list 
of names with interest in the Montana property). 
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Defendant cites to his 2010 affirmation that he had destroyed "all 
known Notarized documents signed by Abbott as proof that he had 
authority to use the signatures in 2009. See BrAplt at 22. But Defendant 
again fails to note that Abbott entered into the agreement specifically 
because: (1) he had discovered Defendant had been using his signature 
without authority; (2) he wanted to immediately stop that unauthorized use; 
and (3) he wanted to clarify ownership of the Montana property so that it 
could be liquidated. See R110:35, 89-90, 111; Ril l (Dei. Ex. 15). 
In sum, Defendant impermissibly treats the findings made by the trial 
court in its judgment of Defendant's guilt as the totality of the evidence. His 
marshaling failure to place the trial court's findings in context of the trial 
evidence alone justifies affirmance. 
C. Alternatively, ample evidence supports Defendant's conviction. 
Even if this Court were to excuse Defendant's briefing and marshaling 
failures, as explained above and more fully below, ample evidence supported 
Defendant's conviction for forgery. 
1. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that 
Defendant lacked authority to use Abbott's signature. 
As stated, a forgery conviction requires using another's name without 
authority to do so. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214,1216 (Utah App. 
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1991) (quoting State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1979)); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-501 (West Supp. 2011). 
Defendant claims that his authority to use Abbott's signature stemmed 
from his Keystone management duties. See Br.Aplt. at 16-21. He further 
claims that "the written documentation conclusively shows that his authority 
to use Mr. Abbott's name lasted from at least 2008 to 2010." See Br.Aplt at 16. 
But, as stated, the marshaled evidence contradicts that claim. To the 
extent Defendant asserts that permission to use Abbott's signature was 
inherent in his duties of managing Keystone, he ignores the well-established 
proposition that "one needs the authority of the person whose name is 
signed." Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216 (finding defendant's belief that she had 
permission from third party irrelevant). It therefore does not matter whether 
the property belonged to Abbott or to Keystone.14 What does matter is that 
Defendant used Abbot's signature on a deed of trust that Defendant 
Defendant states, for example, that he had authority to act in-
Key stone's "best interest" and "[i]t was in Keystone's best interest to correct a 
partial deed of trust error . . . " See Br.Aplt. at 18. But this is irrelevant to 
whether he had Abbott's authority to use Abbott's signature to convey an 
interest in the Montana property to Mangum, who was not a Keystone 
investor. Also, Defendant mischaracterizes the nature of his conduct. The 
partial deed of trust did not merely "correct a partial deed of trust error." 
Rather, it purported to convey an interest in property to a stranger both to 
Abbott and Keystone. 
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provided to Mangum when Abbott had not given Defendant authority to use 
his signature for that purpose. R110:91-92, 94,112. 
Abbott testified that he did not, as Defendant contended, regularly 
provide pre-notarized signatures for Defendant to use as he wished. R110:91-
92. Indeed, Abbott testified that he "never gave [Defendant] permission to 
use those deeds of trusts to do anything other than the registration" of 
Abbott related investors who existed when Abbott signed the partial deeds in 
2007. R110:91-92. This testimony alone—which the trial court presumably 
believed—was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Defendant 
lacked authority to use Abbott's signature on the partial deed of trust. 
2. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that 
Defendant acted with a purpose to defraud Mangum, 
To be guilty of forgery, a defendant must also have a "purpose to 
defraud" or "knowledge that the person is facilitating a fraud." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501(2). See also State v.Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 912-13 (Utah App. 
1999) ("noting forgery conviction requires "the intent to defraud and . . . the 
act was done in furtherance of that intention"); State ex rel. P.S., 2001 UT App 
305, fl 17,38 P.3d 303 (finding "purpose to defraud" requires that a defendant 
act with "the knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud.") (internal citations 
omitted). 
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Defendant claims that the trial court did not find that he acted with the 
"intent to defraud." BrAplt at 11. But the trial court expressly found that 
Defendant acted with a purpose to defraud: Defendant had "no authority to 
sign and he was trying to defraud in accordance with what the elements are 
of the charge." R110:223. Defendant alternatively claims that this finding is 
inconsistent, as a matter of law, with the court's statement that Defendant 
may have been "trying to do the right thing." See BrAplt at 12. But, in 
context, no inherent inconsistency exists. As the trial court recognized, the 
fact that Defendant might have hoped to "later . . . fix the situation" does not 
necessarily mean that he did not act with the purpose to defraud Mangum. 
R110:223. 
"Knowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be inferred from 
the person's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances." 
State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 1 10, 988 P.2d 949 (citations omitted). 
This Court has defined a purpose to defraud as "simply a purpose to use a 
false writing as if it were genuine to gain some advantage/' State ex ret P.S., 
2001 UT App 305, f 17 (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 
App. 1991)) (quotations omitted, emphasis in original). 
A purpose to defraud can be inferred from "the act of completing the 
[unauthorized] check." Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216 (finding purpose to 
-25-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defraud implied where defendant "proffered the check . . . as if genuine" in 
order to gain "extra cash"). Thus, evidence that a defendant used a check, 
payable to himself, which the account holder testified he had not written, 
was sufficient evidence to support a jury's finding that a check was forged. 
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985). See also Kihlsfrom, 1999 UT 
App 289, Tff 13,18. ("Under current Utah law a person who merely utters a 
forged instrument can be inferred to have knowledge of the forgery"). 
Defendant cites two cases to support his position: State v. Winward, 909 
P.2d 909, 912-13 (Utah App. 1995); and State v. Turner, 282 P.2d 1045, 1047 
(Utah 1955). Neither case helps Defendant. Turner is a sodomy case in which 
forgery is merely listed as an example of a crime requiring a "specific 
wrongful intent." Id. In Winward, the defendant was accused of falsely 
endorsing a check written to someone else. 909 P.2d at 911. This Court 
reversed his forgery conviction because the trial evidence and jury 
instructions did not clearly identify the "easily identifiable" victim as the 
person to whom the check was written. Id. at 912-14. Instead, the State also 
"suggested] defendant had committed wrongful acts" against other victims, 
which were largely irrelevant to the alleged forgery. Id. 
Here, the State clearly identified Mangum as the intended victim of 
Defendant's fraudulent conduct. The evidence supports the reasonable 
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inference—which the trial court apparently drew—that Defendant acted with 
the purpose to defraud Mangum. As stated, the evidence shows that 
Defendant, knowing he lacked authority to use Abbott's signature to convey 
an interest to Mangum, did so anyway. The reasonable inference is that he 
did so to falsely convince Mangum that his investment was secured as 
promised in Mangum's agreement with American Star Lending. These facts 
support the additional reasonable inference that Defendant acted to gain 
some advantage - to forestall Mangum from withdrawing his investment or 
taking legal action. This supports the trial court's finding that Defendant 
acted with the purpose to defraud. 
Because the trial court's finding supports no other reasonable inference 
than that Defendant acted with a purpose to defraud, its finding is adequate. 
See Hill v. Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28, tlf 61-62, 216 P.3d 929 ("[b]ecause the 
district court's findings support no inference other than that it found against 
Defendants' affirmative defenses, . . . its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law were adequate"). 
But even if this court were to find that the trial court failed to make a 
specific finding on the element of "purpose to defraud," any error was 
harmless. The undisputed evidence "clearly established" that Defendant had 
the purpose to defraud and any "absent findings can reasonably be implied." 
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See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah App 1993). See also Madsen v. 
Washington Mut Bank FSB, 2008 UT 69, ^ 26, 199 P.3d 898 (noting an 
appellate court has discretion to "affirm the judgment appealed from if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent in the record"). 
Defendant could not explain why the agreed interest payments to 
Magnum suddenly stopped. R110:131. He was under pressure from 
Mangum to provide documentation that Mangum's $172,000 investment in 
American Star Lending was secured as the agreement required. See R110:131-
32; Ri l l (Def. Ex. 3). Defendant repeatedly falsely asserted that the deed 
attached to Abbott's signature was genuine proof of a security agreement, 
despite Abbott's contention it was not. See R110:30,135-39,140,141,154-55, 
164. It is reasonable to infer that Defendant provided Mangum with the deed 
to assuage his concerns, keep his money, and prevent him from consulting 
authorities. 
The evidence therefore supports Defendant's forgery conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 16 December 2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
?#<£« 
tAURAB.T>UPAIX 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. Forgery and producing false identification-Elements of 
offense—Definitions 
(1) As used in this part: 
(a) "Authentication feature" means any hologram, watermark, certification, symbol, code, 
image, sequence of numbers or letters, or other feature that either individually or in 
combination with another feature is used by the issuing authority on an identification 
document, document-making implement, or means of identification to determine if the 
document is counterfeit, altered, or otherwise falsified. 
(b) "Document-making implement" means any implement, impression, template, 
computer file, computer disc, electronic device, computer hardware or software, or 
scanning, printing, or laminating equipment that is specifically configured or primarily 
used for making an identification document, a false identification document, or another 
document-making implement. 
(c) "False authentication feature" means an authentication feature that: 
(i) is genuine in origin but that, without the authorization of the issuing authority, has 
been tampered with or altered for purposes of deceit; 
(ii) is genuine, but has been distributed, or is intended for distribution, without the 
authorization of the issuing authority and not in connection with a lawfully made 
identification document, document-making implement, or means of identification to 
which the authentication feature is intended to be affixed or embedded by the issuing 
authority; or 
(iii) appears to be genuine, but is not. 
(d) "False identification document" means a document of a type intended or commonly 
accepted for the purposes of identification of individuals, and that: 
(i) is not issued by or under the authority of a governmental entity or was issued under 
the authority of a governmental entity but was subsequently altered for purposes of 
deceit; and 
(ii) appears to be issued by or under the authority of a governmental entity. 
(e) "Governmental entity" means the United States government, a state, a political 
subdivision of a state, a foreign government, a political subdivision of a foreign 
government, an international governmental organization, or a quasi-governmental 
organization. 
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(f) "Identification document" means a document made or issued by or under the authority 
of a governmental entity, which, when completed with information concerning a 
particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of 
identification of individuals. 
(g) "Issuing authority" means: 
(i) any governmental entity that is authorized to issue identification documents, means of 
identification, or authentication features; or 
(ii) a business organization or financial institution or its agent that issues a financial 
transaction card as defined in Section 76-6-506. 
(h) "Means of identification" means any name or number that may be used, alone or in 
conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including: 
(i) name, Social Security number, date of birth, government issued driver license or 
identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, or 
employer or taxpayer identification number; 
(ii) unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other 
unique physical representation; or 
(iii) unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code. 
(i) "Personal identification card" means an identification document issued by a 
governmental entity solely for the purpose of identification of an individual. 
(j) "Produce" includes altering, authenticating, or assembling. 
(k) "State" includes any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, possession, or territory of 
the United States. 
(1) "Traffic" means to: 
(i) transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of an item to another, as consideration for 
anything of value; or 
(ii) make or obtain control of with intent to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of an 
item to another. 
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(m) "Writing" includes printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method 
of recording valuable information including forms such as: 
(i) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any other 
symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(ii) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government 
or any agency; or 
(iii) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an 
interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person 
or enterprise. 
(2) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge 
that the person is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, the person: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters the altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any 
writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication, or utterance: 
(i) purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent; 
(ii) purports to be an act on behalf of another party with the authority of that other party; 
or 
(iii) purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other 
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when an original did not exist. 
(3) It is not a defense to a charge of forgery under Subsection (2)(b)(ii) if an actor signs 
his own name to the writing if the actor does not have authority to make, complete, 
execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter the writing on behalf of the party 
for whom the actor purports to act. 
(4) A person is guilty of producing or transferring any false identification document who: 
(a) knowingly and without lawful authority produces, attempts, or conspires to produce 
an identification document, authentication feature, or a false identification document that 
is or appears to be issued by or under the authority of an issuing authority; 
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(b) transfers an identification document, authentication feature, or a false identification 
document knowing that the document or feature was stolen or produced without lawful 
authority; 
(c) produces, transfers, or possesses a document-making implement or authentication 
feature with the intent that the document-making implement or the authentication feature 
be used in the production of a false identification document or another document-making 
implement or authentication feature; or 
(d) traffics in false or actual authentication features for use in false identification 
documents, document-making implements, or means of identification. 
(5) A person who violates: 
(a) Subsection (2) is guilty of a third degree felony; and 
(b) Subsection (4) is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(6) This part may not be construed to impose criminal or civil liability on any law 
enforcement officer acting within the scope of a criminal investigation. 
(7) The forfeiture of property under this part, including any seizure and disposition of the 
property and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, shall be conducted in 
accordance with Title 24, Chapter 1, Utah Uniform Forfeiture Procedures Act. 
(8) The court shall order, in addition to the penalty prescribed for any person convicted of 
a violation of this section, the forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all illicit 
authentication features, identification documents, false transaction cards, document-
making implements, or means of identification. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Transcript of Trial Court's Oral Findings 
Rl 10:220-24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Counsel, to transfer anything out of Keystone. 
Their argument is that he transferred 
everything into Keystone. So why didn't - if that 
document was transferring an interest to Mr. Mangum, 
why does it have Scott Abbott's name on there? That's 
a fraud right there. He has no authority to pass 
anything because, according to Counsel, he's already 
given all of his interest to Keystone. And so that 
document that was given to Mr. Mangum should have said 
either that it was signed by Mr. Robbennolt as himself 
or as representing Keystone Venture Group. They were 
the only people then that had any authority to 
transfer any of that to Mr. Mangum. 
Now, Counsel talked about: Where's the 
fraud? 
Okay, here's the fraud. The fraud is, 
first of all, that that document purported to be the 
act of Scott Abbott and it was not. He testified 
clearly to you, he'd never authorized his signature to 
be on that document. He would not have done that. 
The document was prepared after the bad blood was 
between them. Even by the dates that they have, it 
was transferred when there wasn't - there wasn't any 
business dealings between Mr. Abbott and, again, he 
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had no authority to make any transfer at that time. 
And that's — that's exactly the way the 
Defendant set this up, because then if Mr. Mangum came 
back and sued somebody, he could say: "You can't sue 
Keystone. This is signed by Mr. Abbott." And so his 
only recourse would have been against Mr. Abbott, who 
had no interest and no ability to sign any documents 
or transfer them. 
Now, Mr. Mangum gave the Defendant 
approximately $175,000. He was to get — there were a 
couple of things he was to get in return. He was 
supposed to get payments, monthly payments, and also 
an interest in that property. He did not get those 
things. 
The document that was given to him gave 
him absolutely nothing because it had Scott Abbott's 
name on it, because it was never recorded and because 
there wasn't - there was no equity in the property to 
be given to him. And so the document was completely 
fraudulent. 
It was supposed to be giving him a secured 
interest, which it did not do. It did not give him 
anything. 
Judge, I think clearly the Defendant 
structured this so that he could try to keep 
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3 smoke and mirrors. And that's what he has done today. 
4 Same thing, he has document after document that he's 
5 used to try to deceive these people, and, you know, 
6 gave Mr. Mangum this, and then continued to try to 
7 negotiate with him so he could figure out some way to 
8 appease him without actually giving the money back, 
9 and by transferring things to him in which there was 
10 no interest. That's exactly what he's done today: 
11 Just given you document after document that is just 
12 smoke and mirrors, Judge, and we would ask the Court 
13 to find him guilty of the forgery. 
14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Amber, 
15 let's make sure that the exhibits get back to me. 
16 Let me first say, thank you, Counsel. 
17 Respect is a big part of what we do here in the court 
18 system. I see that being shown today. Not only for 
19 each other but to the Court as well as to the 
20 witnesses who testified and all others that were 
21 involved and you should be commended for that. 
22 My plan is to review these documents, 
23 these exhibits that have been presented, go over my 
24 notes and come back with a verdict today. I don't 
25 think that it will take me, hopefully, as long as a 
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jury would. But I think that I have taken enough 
notes and I know what I need to look at and what I 
want to look at, in my mind. So, if you wouldn't mind 
waiting around. And if I think it's going to take 
longer, I'll have Amber just get your cellphone 
numbers and then I'll get back with you before too 
long. But I'd like to take care of this today. And 
that way we can move forward with this. 
So, we'll be in recess. 
(Recess.) 
THE COURT: Thank you, please be seated. 
Okay. We are back on the record in the 
matter of State of Utah versus Kelly James Robbennolt, 
Case 091401782 
All parties are present, including the 
Defendant, Mr. Robbennolt. 
This is a criminal action involving the 
charge the Forgery, a Third Degree Felony being 
alleged against Mr. Robbennolt. 
After having heard the evidence and 
testimony of three witnesses, Mr. Abbott, Mr. Mangum, 
as well as Mr. Nixon, that's all the witness testimony 
that I received along with the exhibits that I have 
had"a chance to overlook. And there were some other 
additional information provided by Mr. Hartley 
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background for what happened here. 
And the proof in criminal cases is beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
The State has that burden and in this case 
for the charge of Forgery, it's pretty clear as to the 
first few elements: It's no question that 
Mr. Robbennolt, on-or about January 9th, 2009, Utah 
County, did submit a document to Mr. Mangum, 
purporting to transfer an interest in some property in 
Montana. That was signed by Mr. Abbott. That's been 
acknowledged. There's no dispute as to that. 
The question is: Did he do that to 
defraud? Was his purpose to defraud? And so I've set 
forth some things here that I want to mention. 
Credibility of the witnesses is always at 
issue in these types of cases. No question that's 
what it usually comes down to. And we had three 
witnesses today, and in my mind in watching and 
listening, in trying to establish what their thinking 
might have been, it's dear to me that all parties 
were credible in what they were trying to relate to 
the Court. 
And so I would commend them for that. Not 
always do we get witnesses up that tell the truth, but 
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I think that was the case today. All witnesses were 
relating their remembrance of the facts in a way that 
was truthful. 
Money, money, money is what we're dealing 
with here. That's the ultimate cause of what's going 
on. And then I put down here: Trust, trust, trust. 
That's what I was getting from the testimony and what 
was being relayed. 
No question the Court does find that 
Mr. Robbennolt had no authority to sign on 
Mr. Abbott's behalf. This is relayed by the fact that 
Mr. Abbott's signature was needed because the property 
was in his name. He had to sign even though 
Mr. Robbennolt was part of Keystone because of his 
history or background. At least in this transaction, 
he wasn't a signer. It was all in Mr. Abbott's name. 
I felt that conspicuously absent from the 
documents I received was something from Mr. Kasir in 
the agreement that he entered into with Keystone with 
regard to his interest. 
I didn't have that. I would have like to 
have maybe seen that to see if, in fact, Mr. Abbott 
had signed off on that agreement and where that is, I 
don't know. But I thought maybe that could have been 
important here. 
2 regarding the transaction by Mr. Robbennolt? Not that 
3 I could see. He did this on his own. Normally in j 
4 business relationships, I would think, especially when j 
5 that interest is gone, that authority would still be I 
6 out of respect and trust, at least asked of, mentioned 
7 to, something. But I don't see that that was the case 
8 here as well. 
9 And I put down here as well: Why didn't 
10 the Defendant, Mr. Robbennolt, sign his own name? 
11 Because he couldn't. He needed Mr. Abbott's 
12 signature; that'authority wasn't given. And, again, 
13 it seems to me that Mr. Robbennolt was trying to do ! 
14 what he could to make things right. I think you get i 
15 yourself involved in these kind of things and you do j 
16 things to try and make it right and then you hope that 
17 later you can fix the situation. This is a lot of 
18 money involved. And I think he was trying to do the 
19 right thing, but it doesn't detract from fact that no j 
20 authority to sign and he was trying to defraud in j 
21 accordance with what the elements are of the charge. 
22 Therefore, based upon that, the Court does 
23 judge Mr. Robbennolt guilty of the crime of Forgery, a 
24 Third Degree Felony. And therefore, at this point, we 
25 just need to set a time for sentencing. 
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1 - Mr. Hartley, shall we refer the matter to 
2 AP&P; is that the State's request as well? 
3 MS. RAGAN: It is, Your Honor. | 
4 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Robbennolt, j 
5 you'll need to report to Adult Probation and Parole no 
6 later than 4:00 o'clock tomorrow, provide them I 
7 information they need to complete a presentence < 
8 report. 
9 Sentencing in this matter will be set for j 
10 - it looks like April the 11th at 9:30 in the j 
11 morning. 
12 Where it is a bench trial, Ms. Ragan, I'm 
13 not sure that you need to prepare findings in order. 
14 We can just use our minute entry, but that will be 
15 your choice. 
16 _  MS. RAGAN: I did take some notes, 
17 Your Honor, so... 
18 THE COURT: Again, I appreciate Counsel j 
19 and their efforts today. I would like to keep these 
20 exhibits at least until such time as sentencing. 
21 Did you want these back, Mr. Hartley? J 
22 These weren't actually - j 
23 MR. HARTLEY: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor, j 
24 THE COURT: And is that date going to be | 
25 good for you on the 11th? 
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